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Post-secular sociology
Modes, possibilities and challenges
birgitte schepelern johansen
For long time secularization has been a recurring trope in sociological studies of religion.1 Contested by some (Berger 1999, Casanova 1994 and 2006, 
Luckmann 1970), vigorously defended by others (Bruce 
2000), or rethought, modified and policed (Asad 2003, 
Habermas 2006a, de Vries 2006), the role of religion in 
modern, democratic societies, seen through the lens 
of secularization has consistently remained a field of 
academic interest and research. More than this, secu-
larization (as well as related concepts of secularity, the 
secular and secularism) is part of the rich and multi-
layered historical and cultural context that has provided 
the epistemological foundations of and scholarly ideals 
for many aspects of the academic study of religion. 
However, during the last decade or so, scholarly as well 
as political debates have demonstrated an awareness 
that ‘something has happened’ – something that has 
prompted an alteration of, or at least placed a question 
mark after, notions of secularization, the secular and 
secularism. 
Firstly, Peter Berger (1999) attempted to grasp 
awareness of this change by adding a ‘de-’ to the no-
tion of secularization, and some eight years later Jür-
gen Habermas (2008) suggested the addition of the 
prefix ‘post’ to the notion of the secular. Ever since 
then a rather heated scholarly debate has taken place 
regarding the empirical groundings, the explanatory 
potentials and normative values of concepts such as 
post-secularity and post-secularism (e.g. Harrington 
1 I want to express my thanks to colleagues at the Uni-
versity of Copenhagen and the University of Oslo for 
fruitful discussions on the points made in this article. 
Especially thanks to Andreas Bandak and Thomas 
Brudholm for insightful help in developing the argu-
ments.
2007, Bader 2012, Gorski et al. 2012, McGhee 2013). 
However, what these discussions seem to reveal is 
perhaps more than anything the complex and evasive 
character of the changes they are trying to grasp. Are 
we confronted with significant alterations in the reli-
gious profiles of people living in a Western context, 
which among other things are due to migration from 
other parts of the globe and which have turned out 
not to follow the anticipated routes of modernity? Are 
we dealing with changes in the normative landscape 
of political legitimacy? Are we realizing some (reli-
gious) aspects of life that have been there all along 
but hiding in the dark corners of grand narratives of 
a decline in the significance of the role of religion? Or 
are we talking about changes that are mainly taking 
place within academic circles, where various forms 
of deconstruction and post-colonial critique have put 
the category of religion and secular normativity un-
der scrutiny? Borrowing a succinct expression from 
the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, we seem indeed 
to confront a case of both ‘shifting aims and moving 
targets’ (2005: 1); that is to say there has been a si-
multaneous alteration of scholarly perspectives and 
societal junctures. The conceptions of the secular and 
the post-secular, the narratives they allow for and the 
social reality the terms seek to grasp are at one and 
the same time objects for the scholarly observation 
and shifting contexts that shape, push and compel us 
to tell certain stories and to choose certain research 
strategies. The confusions are not surprising! 
This article seeks to contribute to the ongoing con-
ceptual clarification as to how we can understand the 
alterations of the secular by focusing on the shifting 
aims and grounds that we as scholars inhabit when we 
try to get a hold of our moving targets of social real-
ity (knowing of course all too well that we ourselves 
are part of this moving target). What kinds of shifts 
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are we actually or potentially dealing with? And if we 
assert that the academic disciplines that have religion 
as their specific object are part and parcel of seculari-
zation (as a historical trajectory) and the secular (as 
a state of affairs), what would a shift from the secu-
lar to the post-secular imply for these disciplines? It 
is a curi osity towards these questions that governs 
this article. I will here suggest three different ways of 
understanding the post-secular which all take their 
point of departure from the same conceptualization 
of the secular, namely as always implying a claim 
about the separation of religion from other spheres 
in society. Each of these three understandings of the 
post-secular points towards ways of moving beyond 
this defining idea of separation, and I will discuss 
how they hold at one and the same time a potential 
for sociology to open up towards new approaches to 
the study of religion and also potentially undermine 
our attempts to delimit and grasp the object of study, 
perhaps making some forms of scholarship obsolete. 
Even though my main focus is on academic practices, 
as will become apparent along the way, connections 
can also be made with processes within the political 
realm as well.
Academia beyond books
In pursuing my interrogation of the post-secular and 
its potential implications for the sociology of religion 
(and probably also for a range of the other disciplines 
that have defined themselves specifically through ref-
erence to the category religion), I will not solely take 
as my point of departure the contents of publications, 
which is where discussions about academic positions 
and developments are normally anchored (Ong 1982, 
Barth 2000). Publications are the formal end product 
of academic activity, and they tend therefore to ob-
tain a position as the natural object of observation 
in descriptions of scholarly positions, discussions 
and conflicts. Publications have a fixity that makes 
them mobile and enduring, but they also tend to be 
policed and ‘cleansed’ of certain types of information 
(Barth 2000: 2). By this I mean that texts seldom con-
tain traits of the awkwardness that the authors might 
have experienced while producing them, nor do they 
document the affective investment that is inherent in 
the topic of research. Also, the hierarchies of power 
and the hegemonies of the academic system which 
have made this and not that stance appropriate tend 
either to be absent or at least implicit at the level of 
the texts. Therefore, in this article I will also draw on 
other kinds of material, namely participant observa-
tion and interviews, as a supplement to the textual 
sources, because it is in the personal interactions 
that some of the frictions and ruptures of the shifts 
in context for the academic praxis that I am inter-
ested in reveal themselves. Thus, I will exemplify and 
substantiate some of the more large-scale discussions 
of the secular and the predicaments of sociological 
studies of religion by drawing on a qualitative, praxis- 
oriented research on secular identities and agendas 
carried out at the religious studies departments at 
two Danish universities from 2006–9 (Johansen 
2010, 2011). 
The sociology of religion and the secular imaginary
Before entering into the analysis of current academic 
debates and displacements, some basic clarifications 
regarding my take on the topic are needed. If we set 
out by asserting that the term ‘post-secular’ attempts 
to grasp a situation in which we have somehow moved 
beyond or away from the secular, an obvious route 
to take is to start out by clarifying what we mean by 
‘the secular’. Here I would argue that the notion of 
the secular in many respects holds some of the same 
properties as other ‘grand narrative’ terms, such as, 
for example, modernity and globalization: it is at one 
and the same time the description of a state of affairs, 
a certain theoretical claim, an ideal for societal or-
ganization, and a project of getting there. All of this, 
we could, using a perhaps somewhat worn-out ex-
pression, refer to as the ‘secular imaginary’; in other 
words, a certain way of perceiving, describing and 
engaging with the world that confirms the existence 
of something called religion, which is distinguishable 
from and ideally separated from non-religion (see 
also Asad 2003:13–14; Fitzgerald 2000: 106). This 
imaginary is of course constantly changing and con-
tested, but nevertheless it is constituted by a range of 
differentiations or separations. These differentiations 
imply both semantic and conceptual separations of 
religion from a range of other terms, categories and 
concepts such as law, politics and science, making it 
possible to discuss whether this or that phenomenon, 
institution, action or argument is ‘religious’ or some-
thing else – for example ‘scientific’ or ‘political’. Fur-
ther, the separations are also institutional separations 
of, for example, the churches (and other religious 
organizations) from institutions such as parliament, 
the courts and the universities (Luhmann 1982). It 
is, among other things, through these separations 
that a distinct sphere which can be termed ‘religion’ 
comes into being, and even though the separations 
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are sometimes unclear and elusive they still make it 
possible to act and talk as if they were clear and self-
evidently given. 
Outside the academic sphere, articulating the 
specificities of the sphere of religion often draw on 
a vocabulary related to Protestant Christianity as 
the prototype religion and it is often coloured by the 
language of the emerging natural sciences (Arnal 
2000: 13; Asad 2003: 23; King 1999: 13). Thus, the 
category ‘religion’ often acquires its meaning by be-
ing connoted with beliefs – with the transcendent 
or supernatural (as opposed to knowledge) – not 
the natural, and it is also often assessed qualitatively, 
with levels of sincerity and interior conviction being 
the yardstick by which the more or less religious is 
measured – rather than levels of praxis or experience. 
Understood in this way, the secular (as a certain way 
of both describing and configuring social reality) and 
religion (as a distinct category within this social re-
ality) emerged in tandem. This emergence of course 
has a long and complex history – one that cannot be 
recapitulated here. However, some brief remarks on 
the trajectories of one of the central and constitutive 
separations for the secular imaginary, namely that 
between religion and science, is necessary in order 
to understand the developments and predicaments 
of the academic studies of religion that I will discuss 
later on. 
The distinction between the categories of religion 
and science is a semantic cornerstone, both in the 
formations of church and university as distinctly sep-
arate institutions and in broader popular discourses 
on religion and modernity. And often the distinction 
is articulated as being the result of a long process in 
which science has been gradually liberated from re-
ligion (Drees 2008, Latour 2002, McMullin 2008). 
This narrative about what philosopher and historian 
Ernan McMullin (2008: 40) has called ‘the grand reli-
gion–science conflict’ has a certain dramatic struc-
ture, where a series of irreversible revolutions are 
seen progressively to have led to the final separation 
of science from religion and thus moved history from 
a dark past into an era of enlightenment. It is a narra-
tive with its own heroes and villains, characterized by 
certain key events such as the Copernican revolution, 
Galilei’s conviction and the evolutionary theories of 
Darwin, which have undermined the biblical world-
view, and through these events we have gained more 
and truer knowledge of how things really are (King 
1999, Andersen and Munk Jensen 2006). It is also a 
narrative with two central premises, namely; 1) that 
science, when liberated from religion, will provide us 
with increased factual and more empirically correct 
knowledge of how the world is, while religion is at 
best irrelevant and at worst a hindrance to this de-
velopment; and 2) that science and religion appear 
in the singular as monolithic and clearly demarcated 
entities, serviced by distinct institutions. This nar-
rative was mainly coined in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries2 – a period in which sev-
eral European countries witnessed a Kulturkampf  be-
tween conservative, church-minded voices and their 
liberal, anti-clerical opponents (Molendijk and Pels 
2 Not least due to the work of two Americans, the 
philosopher, chemist and historian William Draper 
(1811–82) and the philosopher Andrew Dickson 
White (1832–1918) who wrote extensively on the 
problematic role of the Church with regards to scien-
tific freedom. The solution for both was that science 
would eventually prevail, making religion obsolete –  
a position rearticulated several times, not least during 
the blooming of new atheism in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.
Joseph Wright: The Alchymist in Search of the Philoso-
pher’s Stone, Discovers Phosphorus, and prays for the suc-
cessful Conclusion of his operation, as was the custom of 
the Ancient Chymical Astrologers (1771). Derby Museum 
and Art Gallery, Derby.
W
ik
im
ed
ia
 C
om
m
on
s
7Approaching Religion • Vol. 3, No. 1 • June 2013 
1998). It was also the period which saw the growth 
in empirical, positivistically-oriented social sciences, 
and it was the time where the first chairs for the his-
torical, comparative study of religion were founded 
at European universities (Sharp 1986). And, I will ar-
gue, it still forms the basis for at least some aspects of 
the disciplinary fields of the sociology of religion and 
the history of religion.
This narrative of the separation of religion and 
science, with its emphasis on the unity and eman-
cipation of the scientific realm is obviously not the 
only one to be told about the history of science, and 
it has been challenged and modified on several occa-
sions (see Drees 2008 for example). Nevertheless it 
has played a crucial role in shaping the way we (also 
as scholars) think about the category of religion, not 
least in terms of its – often oppositional – relation 
to notions of the natural, the empirically testable, or 
the factual. Religion becomes that which escapes the 
empirically testable: it becomes the subjective (in the 
shape of beliefs and convictions), which should not 
be allowed to interfere with the work of the scholar 
– and it becomes a sphere about which the scholar 
ideally should not make any judgements. It is also 
interesting in this respect that the notion of meth-
odological agnosticism was born precisely out of late 
nineteenth-century debates on science and religion.3 
This position still seems to be the most – if not the 
only – legitimate way for scholars of religion to ar-
ticulate the relationship between scholar and object 
(Droogers 1996), and in a sense it embodies the ethos 
of the modern, secularizing state, because it demands 
neutrality towards and evaluative equality between 
the various religions (Johansen 2011). Thus, the for-
mation of the category of religion is also tied to a cer-
tain way of organizing reality: as religion gradually 
becomes excluded from the realm of the empirically 
real, ‘the social’ or ‘history’ emerges as the final and 
only accessible context for all activities, including 
the human activities that are categorized as religious 
(Milbanks 1991: 101; see also Asad 2003: 191). And 
if we follow the narrative through in its original ver-
sion, a decline in, and ultimately the disappearance 
of, religion would be the end result (see Casanova 
1994 for an overview and critique).
While the supernatural or the transempirical, 
when identifying something as religion, have also 
been widely applied as key features within the schol-
arly disciplines of religion, the particular colouring of 
3 The term was coined by Thomas Huxley, the younger 
apprentice of Charles Darwin. 
the category ‘religion’ as pertaining to inward beliefs 
and sincerity has mostly been prevalent outside the 
academic sphere of the social and humanist sciences 
of religion. Thus, large parts of the academic work 
done on religion since the founding fathers such as 
Max Müller, Cornelius Petrus Tiele and later on Mir-
cea Eliade,  have been characterized by attempts ex-
actly to escape this ‘Christo-centric’ approach to reli-
gion (Johansen 2010: 228–34; see also de Vries 2008). 
The attempts to avoid a category of religion that sim-
ply replicates the features of Protestant Christianity 
have in some settings resulted in a scholarly emphasis 
on religious practices, rituals, experiences and emo-
tions instead of, for example, the assertion of more 
or less coherent ‘theologies’ as cognitive or moral 
systems (see also Orsi 2004). However, the notion of 
belief, with its connotations of conviction, worldview, 
imagination and non-knowledge is, I have argued, 
still also very much present as the epitome of the cat-
egory of religion in the academic sphere (Johansen 
2010: 231). The recurring focus on faith and beliefs is 
especially present in oral disseminations of academic 
ideas, such as in contexts of teaching, informal social-
izing, or in the question and answer sessions following 
presentations of papers at seminars and conferences; 
disseminations that are all unleashed from the more 
tightly-structured forms of the publications, lectures 
and conference presentations. So even though many 
scholars of religion take pride in distancing them-
selves from what is perceived as mainstream, Chris-
tian conceptions of religion, the question ‘what do 
they believe?’ remains a favourite one. 
The formation of the modern category of religion 
by means of its distinction from various categories 
of non-religion, such as science, politics and law,4 
4 Other contexts and developments could obviously 
be mentioned as equally important for the formation 
of the category of religion, including among others 
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have of course played out in a variety of different 
ways, perhaps making it more appropriate to speak 
of secular imaginaries in the plural (Casanova 2008, 
Modood 2011). However, evoking the notion of the 
secular, explicitly articulated or implicitly alluded to, 
always implies this reference to a separation between 
religion and something else – let us just refer to it as 
non-religion. This idea of a possible separation (of 
categories, arguments, practices, institutions, con-
victions, sentiments) lies at the heart of secular epis-
temology, and this idea still functions as a powerful 
point of identification and structuration for political 
as well as scholarly discourses (see also Taylor 2007). 
To give a practical example: the students on the first 
year courses at the department where I did my PhD 
research in 2006 to 2009 were constantly reminded, 
that of course you can be religious and study religion 
at a scientific level at the same time – but then you 
should really know effectively how to separate things. 
If you do not, it will be noticed and you may occa-
sionally be sanctioned more or less explicitly for, for 
example, lack of objectivity and neutrality or for ex-
pressions of subjective bias or for attempting to pro-
mote a religious agenda under the cover of scientific 
discourse (Johansen 2011). 
Summing up: the point is that our object of study 
(religion) and our ways of engaging with it, delimit-
ing it, and policing it, are entangled in the history of 
a certain epistemological framework of, among other 
things, differentiation/separations, the empirical and 
rational grounding of academic work, and the idea of 
the social as the ultimate context for and cause of – 
well – everything. This context is what Charles Taylor 
(2007: 539) has termed ‘the immanent frame’, and it 
is also here that we find the idea of the subjective in-
side sharply separated from the objective outside, it is 
here that we find the idea of the neutral ground from 
where we can observe things as they really are, it is 
here that we find the distinctions between the natural 
and the supernatural, between the factual and the il-
lusory (rather than the good and the bad) which is 
constitutive of the category of religion – and which 
still largely frames and legitimizes academic work 
(see also Asad 2003: 28–36). 
colonialism , missionary activities and religious apolo-
getics, see W. C. Smith 1963, Chidester 1996, King 
1999, Masuzawa 2005, Fitzgerald 2007, Johansen 
2010 for overviews and discussions.
Predicaments 
The embeddedness of the category of religion in a cer-
tain semantic and epistemological landscape where 
religion and science are positioned on each side of 
a rather sharp divide is, I will argue, the reason why 
the disciplines that have religion as their distinct 
and defining object have been somewhat reluctant 
to embrace the more radical versions of deconstruc-
tion, actor network theory, social constructivism and 
the like (see also Droogers 1996, Stausberg 2008, 
Spickard 2009 for similar observations). Here, I 
would suspect some objections, because obviously 
you can find scholars working within these academic 
strands among sociologists and historians of religion 
(see, e.g., Chidester 1996, Fitzgerald 2000, King 1999, 
McCutcheon 1997 and 2003). But I will still claim that 
reluctance about going too far down this path is pre-
sent as a basic tendency in many areas of the field, and 
this tendency manifests itself openly on certain occa-
sions. And this is where I will turn to the narrower 
empirical context for my reflections, namely my work 
on the academic practices at two of the Danish de-
partments for the study of religion (the departments 
host both the history and sociology of religion). 
Based on participant observation in class, in-
terviews with staff and scrutiny of the texts used in 
teaching, as well as hanging out at the departmental 
meetings, seminars and lunches, combined with ob-
servations of and conversations with colleagues from 
other geographical contexts, I made the case that at 
least some areas of the academic practice were per-
vaded by what I would call modern ideals of knowl-
edge and science. By this I mean that notions of un-
biased objectivity as an ideal (however regulatory), of 
a straightforwardly accessible empirical reality upon 
which we can all agree, of universalism, of clear-cut 
categories and of accumulative knowledge prevailed 
(see also Bauman 1991, Latour 2002). Further, when 
the story of a study was told, it was mostly (but again, 
not always) by means of reference to the aforemen-
tioned narrative of the religion–science conflict: the 
narrative of the gradual liberation of science – in the 
singular – from the irrational restrictions of religion. 
And these ideals simultaneously imposed mean-
ings on the category of religion as being composed 
of the subjective, the biased, the non-empirical, the 
supernatural, non-knowledge and so on. The inter-
esting thing, however, was that obviously there were 
other prominent conceptualizations of religion and 
other scholarly approaches which referred more to 
academic strands such as hermeneutics or discourse 
analysis, which problematize ideas of pure observa-
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tion or neutral grounds. And there were versions of 
the history of the study which focused more on colo-
nialism, power/knowledge relations and politics. But 
when articulating the relationship explicitly between 
religion and science as abstract categories, the mod-
ern narrative seemed immediately to structure the 
discourse into a polarized field of opposed positions, 
with no middle ground possible. 
One of the things that was particularly interesting 
to notice was the affective investments that several of 
the employees and students at the department had 
in defending and sanctioning these polarizations. 
Especially the search for what we could call a reli-
gious ‘pollution’ of the scientific sphere in the work 
of other scholars, or the (alleged) religious commit-
ment of a colleague seemed to be a rather gleeful or 
exciting activity, not least in teaching situations. The 
same kind of engagement revealed itself in the search 
for especi ally Christian biases in historical sources 
or theoretic al frameworks. This search for the separ-
ation and purification of the realms of science and 
religion can, I will suggest, best be understood as a 
variation on the theme of ideological de-masking, 
which as Bruno Latour has argied is one of the hall-
marks of modern science (Latour 2002: 60–71). 
Alongside the affirmation of modern, secular ideals 
of research, I noticed that the more radical decon-
structivist and social constructivist approaches to the 
scientific work were not something that was immedi-
ately welcomed by several researchers. Not because 
they were not known or under-
stood – because they were and 
are – but people seemed either 
disinterested or very ad hoc in 
their way of using them. Or 
they downright rejected them 
because, as one informant elo-
quently put it: ‘These kinds of 
arguments make the study of 
religion nothing more than a 
store-house of opinion’ (Jensen 
2003: 270). Either way, slight 
irritation was not uncommon 
when confronted with various 
deconstructionist or ‘post’-per-
spectives.
Subsequently, I discovered 
that I did not stand alone in this 
observation of scholarly prefer-
ences. Writing the history of 
the academic study of religion 
in Europe, the Norwegian his-
torian of religion Michael Stausberg (2008) has noted 
the same kind of distancing from – or willed igno-
rance of – the academic strands that go most straight-
forwardly into the heartland of the epistemology of 
modern science. And in 2009 the American sociolo-
gist of religion, Jim Spickard, organized a session at 
the International Society for the Sociology of Reli-
gion (ISSR) conference on exactly this theme, which 
he introduced with the following words: 
The sociology of religion has lagged behind 
other fields in the way we think about how we 
generate knowledge. Where other disciplines 
argue about the relative merits of positivism, 
social constructivism, critical realism, and 
standpoint theory, we, with few exceptions, re-
hash the thirty-year-old debate about “objectiv-
ity” and “subjectivity” – and do so in relatively 
naive terms. (Spickard 2009: 1.)
Of course this is by no means a fair description of 
all work done by sociologists of religion (neither 
was it intended so by Spickard). It was rather an at-
tempt to mark a tendency, a consciousness, a certain 
inton ation that seems to pervade much of the work 
being done within the discipline. The question that 
I find interesting on this occasion is the following: if 
we take these observations of the sociological study 
of religion as adequate, why do some disciplines 
more readily catch on to certain ideas than others? 
Universum. C. Flammarion, Holzschnitt, Paris 1888. Kolorit: Heikenwaelder 
Hugo, Wien 1998.
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And why are some approaches avoided? In the case 
of the sciences of religion, I will argue that this spe-
cific tendency has to do with the fact that academic 
approaches that favour what the Danish sociologist 
Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen has termed ‘empty ontol-
ogies’ (Andersen 1999), such as the more radical de-
constructivist or discourse-oriented approaches, po-
tentially challenge a lot of the basic distinctions in the 
secular imaginary which have upheld the cat egory of 
religion as an observable object for the scholar. These 
approaches question the idea of neutrality, of objec-
tivity, of knowledge (in the singular) as opposed to 
various kinds of non-knowledge, be they opinions, 
beliefs, or faiths. And perhaps most importantly: they 
question the idea of an ontologic al solidity that forms 
the basis of any assessments of the natural or the em-
pirical testable, as contrasted with the supernatural. 
Instead they oftentimes promote contingency and 
the exercise of power as the main source of academ-
ic legitimacy, rather than factual knowledge. And 
by doing so, they challenge one side of the defining 
relationship in the religion/science complex whilst 
simultaneously making the other side elusive and 
maybe even illusive. This might also be the reason 
why even scholars of other discip lines that go down 
the more radical ‘post’-alleys are still reluctant about 
its consequences when it comes to religion. Even 
though written some fifteen years ago, I still fully 
agree with the Dutch anthropologist André Droogers 
who has argued that regardless of the epistemologi-
cal ruptures that have made obsolete claims to a uni-
fied objective position for the scholar and opened 
the doors for multi-sited observations and positions, 
the only remaining legitimate position to be taken 
towards religion is methodological agnosticism and 
its claim to neutrality. He encapsulates the situation 
thus: ‘Methodological theism remains taboo, despite 
lip-service to post-modernism’ (Droogers 1996: 52). 
The potential challenge of modern, secular episte-
mology that lies within this field is maybe the reason 
why at least some theologians, as opposed to many 
sociologists of religion, have caught on very posi-
tively to the more radical deconstruct ivist and post-
modernist theorizations, because they have opened 
new possibilities for theology as a legitim ate voice in 
the academic field (for example Milbanks 1991, Sløk 
1999, Cheetham 2005). 
Post-secular sociology?
So, being part and parcel of a secular imaginary, 
where categories not only of religion, science, politics 
and law but also of the factual, the illusory, the ob-
jective and the subjective, knowledge, faith and em-
pirical materiality are organized in relation to each 
other in certain ways, where is the academic study of 
religion left if, as some scholars have argued, we are 
moving towards contexts characterized not by secu-
larity but by post-secularity? The philosopher Hent 
de Vries formulates the challenge that might be posed 
by such a shift in the study of religion as follows: it 
would constitute
the task of rethinking “religion” and “religious 
studies” in a contemporary world whose institu-
tions and publics are increasingly “post-secular” 
in their outlook, suspended – at least in the 
West – between on the one hand an Enlight-
enment project and a democratic republican-
ism and liberalism originally premised upon 
rationalization, differentiation, and privatiza-
tion, and, on the other, a less explicit process of 
reenchantment, if not outright remythologiza-
tion (deVries 2008: xiii).
Some of the discussions and lines of conflict men-
tioned in the previous section could be seen precisely 
as a reaction to such challenges through an insist-
ence or reinforcement of secular semantics, which 
in some contexts are under reconfiguration. But let 
us try to be more precise. Taking a closer look at the 
post-secular challenge that de Vries points to, I will 
suggest that we should distinguish between at least 
three different, yet interrelated understandings of the 
post-secular which may each imply different possible 
roads for the sociological study of religion. I will here 
allow myself the somewhat non-sociological luxury 
of engaging in more tentative speculations in order to 
illuminate some current movements and tendencies. 
However, such speculations should never overlook 
the actual practices and displacements that take place 
both inside and outside the academy.
Keeping the categories
If we start by affirming that the post-secular al-
ways refers to a situation in which we have some-
how moved beyond the secular, and that the secular 
at its core is about the separation of religion from 
non-religion , sometimes linked to a decline in the 
religious sphere, we could start by exploring the 
post-secular which is understood as the living on, or 
maybe even resurgence, of religion. The term post-
secular is here an attempt to grasp that the prediction 
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about a steady decline in the role of religion as an in-
evitable consequence of processes of modernization 
has turned out to be untenable, forcing the secular 
states to reckon with the endurance of religion and 
thus to re-think their self-perception (de Vries 2006: 
3). This is the understanding of the post-secular that 
we find in the work of, for example, Jürgen Habermas 
(2006b, 2008), who is one of the scholars who has 
contributed most profoundly to coining the term. 
In his lecture of 2007 (published 2008) ‘Notes on a 
post-secular society’ Habermas characterizes West-
ern societies as post-secular because they have had to 
come to terms with the ongoing relevance of religion. 
Religious institutions as well as religious arguments 
remain or reappear as legitimate points of reference 
in peoples’ lives (including their political lives), and 
the presence of visible religious minorities, especially 
Muslims, have boosted the awareness among other-
wise disengaged ‘cultural’ Christians about their own 
religious backgrounds. Further, non-European soci-
eties have in many cases followed other paths than the 
one outlined in the theoretical complex of the ‘secu-
larization paradigm’ (Bruce 2000) which includes 
functional differentiation, constitutional democracy, 
scientific evolution and the gradual fading away, or at 
least privatization, of religion. Regarding the political 
realm, this situation has caused some scholars to talk 
about ‘a crisis in secularism’ (for example Roy 2007), 
pointing to the need to rethink legitimate political 
self-identities in terms other than secularism. This is 
not because the populations in Europe have become 
more religious on a personal level, but because of the 
acute awareness that the grand narrative of secular 
modernity has proved itself wrong. Other scholars 
have described some of the same developments, but 
under the heading of de-secularization rather than 
post-secularity (Berger 1999). 
In this version of the post-secular the basic separ-
ations between religion and other categories are 
maintained. What is challenged is rather the idea of 
a decline in the presence and importance of religion. 
For the sociology of religion, this way of moving be-
yond the secular merely provides an increase in topics 
for investigation and probably also an increase in the 
political relevance of and interest in the research be-
ing done, that is, more work and more funding. And 
in many aspects, this has in fact been the case for the 
last decade or so, where we have witnessed a grow-
ing interest in religion in many strands of academia, 
often focused on Islam and Muslims. This focus has 
been spurred by the increasing political interest in 
the entanglement of religion in discussions of identi-
ty, belonging, migration, and social cohesion; themes 
that will continue to be of interest for any state that 
guards its borders and maintains citizenship as an en-
try to social benefits. In this version of post-secular-
ity, the basic structures of and premises for the socio-
logical study of religion remain largely unquestioned. 
The real challenge is continuously to avoid the slip-
pery slope of responsive sociology where the major-
ity of the research being done is framed by questions 
formulated in the political sphere. This situation has 
to some extent already and for some years now been 
the reality regarding sociological work on Islam and 
Muslims in a Western context, where much research 
is carried out within a security nexus of religion, in-
tegration and radicalization (Sunier 2009, Johansen 
and Spielhaus 2012). 
Re-configuring the categories
While the prior notion of post-secularity pertains 
to a rejection of the ‘decline’ aspect of the secular 
imaginary, the following one rather pertains to a 
re-arrangement of the ‘separation’ aspect. Thus, we 
could also pursue the ‘moving beyond the secular’ 
as a question of religion’s resurgence or (re-)appear-
ance in domains of society from which it has hith-
erto been functionally separated. That is, we might 
be witnessing a weakening of the polarizing effect of 
secular discourses. Let us first look at the institution-
al level. Here the term ‘post-secular’ would refer to 
a situation in which institutions that have previously 
been defined by their separation from religion open 
their doors to discussions and forms of institutional 
cooperation which have previously been considered 
illegitimate. With regards to the political system, 
theorists such as Chantal Mouffe have advocated this 
approach with regard to the appearance of religion 
in politics. Under the heading of radical democracy, 
or democratic supremacy, the argument is that the 
public spaces, as the ground for dialogue and debate, 
should be maintained in their structural forms, but 
it should be legitimate to pursue any kind of goal or 
to adopt any style of reasoning – including religious 
ones – as long as the ground rules of the institution 
are kept (Mouffe 2006). In somewhat the same way, 
especially scholars such as philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre (1990) and theologian David Cheetham 
(2005) have, with regard to the university, argued for 
the abandonment of neutrality and universality as 
carriers of authority for academic work. Instead the 
university should become a space for engaged dis-
agreement and dialogue between different epistemic 
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horizons. Such an idea of the university might, ac-
cording to Cheetham
contrast with more liberal, modernistic notions 
of a neutral space which, for example, perceives 
religious and moral commitments as interfer-
ence in objective enquiries and seeks scholars 
who engage as detached observers rather than 
as protagonists (Cheetham 2005: 18).
Of course there have always been scholars who iden-
tify themselves as religious, but the point here is that 
this should no longer be po-
liced within the boundaries 
of methodologic al agnosti-
cism. Rather, the methodo-
logical agnosticism should be 
abandoned in favour of, for 
example, genuine atheism, ag-
nosticism, Christian beliefs 
or Buddhist cosmologies, as 
legitim ate horizons for the 
production of knowledge. And 
the sociologists could, instead 
of taking for granted that ‘the 
social’ is the natural frame-
work for our argumentation 
(the most important discussions being to refine the 
methods for its investigation), take it on as a prior-
ity task to show the work being done in the name of 
the idea of ‘social reality’ – where it origin ates and 
emanates, what purposes it serves – and argue why it 
should be privileged as the context sine qua non for 
the academic work. This line of argument, which pro-
motes an epistemic pluralism, has also been promot-
ed among the departments of European universities 
which have attempted to open their doors to Islamic 
theologists as legitimate members of the secular uni-
versity (Johansen 2006, 2008). 
Breaking down the categories
In the just described version of the post-secular, the 
institutions (parliament, or the university) and the 
categories (religion, politics and science) remain, 
but the possible ways they can relate to each other 
has changed. But we could also imagine a third ver-
sion of post-secularity, which is perhaps a radicalized 
version of the second. This version is by far the most 
speculative of the three proposed understandings of 
the post-secular; nevertheless there do seem to be de-
tectable outlines of it, especially in the more anthro-
pologically-oriented areas of the study of religion. In 
this version of the post-secular, the issue at stake is 
not that religion appears in spheres from which it has 
hitherto been excluded. The issue is whether in some 
academic areas we are witnessing a more profound 
reconfiguration, or even breakdown, of the distinc-
tions that have previously imposed meaning on 
categories such as religion and science. In this case 
the post-secular relates to the secular as does post-
modernity to modernity: they both involve moving 
beyond a set of logics that have previously set the 
scene. In the case of the study of religion, one of my 
own observations supporting 
this tendency, however limited 
it may be, is that some of the 
core projects that have hith-
erto engaged (and enraged) 
scholars of religion, have lost 
their zest. Among these are the 
formation and cultivation of a 
scholarly category of religion 
that is not tinged with Chris-
tian connotations. This project 
has by no means been rejected 
by the younger generations of 
scholars, but it simply does not 
appear to be so pressing any-
more. And maybe this has to do with a weakening 
of other projects as well, because the same goes for 
the work that such a category of scholarship was in-
tended to do: namely to make possible an objective, 
fair and above all, neutral, analysis of the various reli-
gions. Such a project may for some have become un-
tenable due to, among other things, challenges ema-
nating from other scholarly discourses. Among these 
are, besides the discourse of de-constructivism, those 
which challenge the modern, Western hegemony in 
the shape of new scholarly discourses from the for-
mer periphery (‘the empire writes back’) and more 
recently those which favour notions of un-decided-
ness and over-determination in social relations. The 
consequence of such a situation in which the secular 
insistence on sharp boundaries, at least in some parts 
of academia, is under fire, is that the term religion 
might very well prevail (and nothing currently sug-
gests that it will disappear); people will continue to 
use it and the amount of research on things that are 
termed religious will most likely increase. But the 
secular semantic landscape (not to be confused with 
a tiny branch of this landscape called secularization 
theory, paradigms and so on) might steadily erode, 
and as a consequence ‘religion’ as a unifying and im-
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mediately understandable term seems to be losing its 
received reference (de Vries 2008: 1). This weakening 
of ideals, positions and battle-lines which have previ-
ously provided a strong sense of direction for the so-
ciology of religion sometimes leads to the increased 
insistence on exactly these ideals – and it potentially 
freezes or fossilizes some aspects of the sciences of 
religion (Johansen 2010: 262–7).
Another way to handle such fragmentations be-
sides the re-enforcement of modern ideals of science 
is to let go of the sharp and defining distinctions 
between religion and science, and instead engage 
in what André Droogers has called the one-field ap-
proach (Droogers 2008). Such a shift implies that 
the hierarchical gap between researcher and object 
is reduced by eschewing the ideals of a neutral, ob-
servational researcher who is concerned with bias. 
Instead the scholar should engage in an active sub-
ject-to-subject interaction. Yet another approach is 
to favour a heightened focus on flows, assemblages 
and the oftentimes undecided character of life, in-
stead of objectifying distinct areas of peoples’ lives 
as expressions of ‘religion’. These kinds of approaches 
can, for example, be discerned in the increasing ten-
dency among anthropologists especially, as well as 
different kinds of scholars of religion, to focus on 
the displacements of what we hitherto have termed 
religion, and how these displacements are intimately 
interwoven into the textures of everyday life (see, e.g., 
Orsi 2004, Heelas and Woodhead 2005, Jeldtoft 2011, 
Bandak 2012). One consequence of the focus on eve-
ryday life, assemblages, flows and un-decidedness is 
that another core notion of the study of religion be-
comes less obvious; namely the idea of systematized, 
identifiable religions – in the plural – incorporating 
a certain belief system, certain canonical texts and a 
distinct set of rituals (Droogers 2008: 452). Both ear-
lier and more recent works on the idea of world reli-
gions (W. C. Smith 1963, J. Z. Smith 1978, Masuzawa 
2005) have argued that the notion of distinct reli-
gions might end up in somewhat the same predica-
ment that anthropology has experienced with regard 
to the idea of distinct cultures: that it is the product 
of a certain type of analytical observation made by 
the scholar rather than an empirical reality. When ap-
proaching the contexts in which people actually live 
their lives, such distinct entities tend to dissolve into 
a muddle (Clifford 1988). 
The dissolving, fully or partially, of the notion of 
distinct, identifiable religions can provide interesting 
insights into the everyday lives of people (including 
those of scholars); however they might eventually 
render problematic one of the core ‘products’ of the 
classical sociology of religion, namely the ongoing, 
large-scale, quantitative surveys. First and foremost 
because these surveys are based precisely upon the 
idea of the existence of distinct, identifiable religions 
(again mainly Christianity, Judaism, Islam) which are 
characterized by certain beliefs and certain practices. 
If this kind of categorization eventually becomes aca-
demically untenable, then major readjustments in the 
lines of enquiry will be needed, which makes long-
term comparison problematic.
Finally, I cannot help but wonder if the letting 
go of the central, defining distinctions surrounding 
the category ‘religion’, especially when combined 
with a focus on the flows of everyday life, may not 
increasingly render the very task of determining 
whether what you study is religion or not more or 
less irrele vant. As the theologian Gert Theissen 
(2004) suggested a couple of years ago, the study 
of religion in which it is understood as something 
which is practised in distinct disciplines will dissolve 
into more general studies of culture – a destiny it is 
likely to share with theology. The central challenge 
for the sociology of religion will then be to survive 
as a distinct, yet meaningful discipline with an obvi-
ous object, rather than becoming an obscure branch 
of anthropology or soci ology, because we no longer 
have a straightforward answer to the question: the 
sociology of what? However, should this be the case, 
there is not necessarily anything to mourn: scholarly 
disciplines emerge and vanish in conjunction with 
our way of knowing the world; new connections and 
cooper ations are established, new stories, agendas 
and stakes will engage us if we are ready to embrace 
them. And as for now, the sociology of religion is still 
very much a part of the academic landscape. 
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